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Abstract
This paper addresses the need for a measure of the uncertainty
that is associated with the results calculated through tax policy be-
havioural microsimulation modelling. Deriving the analytical measure
would be extremely complicated, therefore, a simulated approach is
proposed which generates a pseudo sampling distribution of aggregate
measures based on the sampling distribution of the estimated labour
supply parameters. This approach, which is very computer intensive,
is compared to a more time-eﬃcient approach where the functional
form of the sampling distribution is assumed to be normal. The re-
sults show that in many instances the results from the two approaches
are quite similar. The exception is when aggregate measures for minor
types of payments, involving relatively small groups of the population,
are examined.
∗We are grateful to the Department of Family and Community Services, who funded
an earlier research project, from which the extension in this paper followed. The views
expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the
Minister for Family and Community Services, the Department of Family and Community
Services or the Commonwealth Government.
11 Introduction
Behavioural tax microsimulation models, which are based on large scale cross-
sectional surveys and use estimates of preference functions allowing for many
individual characteristics, can provide valuable policy advice about the likely
labour supply, revenue and expenditure implications of a wide range of policy
reforms. However, these implications are usually in the form of point esti-
mates and microsimulation models typically provide no information about
the sampling distribution of labour supply or expenditure changes. Such in-
formation would be of much interest to those involved in designing policy
reforms with speciﬁc objectives and constraints in mind.
Uncertainty regarding a model’s projections can arise for a variety of rea-
sons.1 These include, for example, the fact that estimates of wage rates are
used (this is particularly true for non-workers in the dataset where wages
are obtained from estimated wage functions) and preference parameters are
estimated. In addition, sampling variations arise from the fact that the data-
base is a sample of the population and household weights must be used for
aggregation purposes. This is particularly problematic for groups where only
a small number of observations are available.2 Errors can of course also arise
from incorrect modelling of the complex administrative rules governing taxes
and beneﬁts, reporting errors and problems relating to the (possibly endoge-
nous) incomplete take-up of beneﬁts. The present paper focusses on just one
of these sources of error. Its aim is to investigate methods of obtaining con-
ﬁdence intervals where the appropriate distribution of values arises from the
sampling distribution of parameter estimates of preference functions. Maxi-
mum likelihood estimation gives rise to a variance/covariance matrix for the
estimated parameters, which forms the basis of the approaches discussed here.
Analytical derivation of the sampling distribution of the various microsimu-
lation outcomes is ruled out in view of the complexity of the transformations
1For a general discussion, see Klevmarken (1998).
2This source of error was examined by Pudney and Sutherland (1994). They concen-
trated on the use of weights to deal with diﬀerential responses by diﬀerent population
strata, assuming that response rates are known. Sample weights are now often based on
calibration methods, following Deville and Särndal (1992), where extraneous information
about selected population totals is used.
2involved.3 The decision to concentrate on uncertainties associated with pref-
erence functions does not arise from any judgement that the other sources
are not important. Rather, those sources exist with both arithmetic and be-
havioural modelling, and interest here is on the additional uncertainty which
results from the estimation requirements of behavioural models.
The approach is discussed in the context of the Melbourne Institute
Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS). This is a behavioural microsimula-
tion model for Australia. It uses as a database the Survey of Income and
Housing Costs (SIHC), made available by the Australian Bureau of Statistics
in conﬁdentialised unit record ﬁle (CURF) form. The labour supply para-
meters included in MITTS are based on estimates using the SIHC following
a similar approach to Van Soest (1995). Labour supply is modelled using a
discrete hours approach where individuals select from a number of discrete
hours points, and estimated preference functions allow for considerable pop-
ulation heterogeneity.4 The discrete hours approach is described brieﬂyi n
Section 2. A basic simulation approach to the construction of conﬁdence
intervals is described in Section 3. This involves the numerical production of
what may be called a pseudo sampling distribution of the variable of interest.
Numerical results for a simple policy reform, using this approach in MITTS,
are presented in Section 4. This reform involves a ﬂattening of budget con-
straints resulting from a reduction in beneﬁt abatement, or taper, rates. The
basic simulation method is highly computer intensive and can take several
weeks or even months, depending on the number of households in the sample
and the speed of the computer used. A much more time-eﬃcient approximate
method is suggested in Section 5. Conclusions are in Section 6.
3However, Pudney and Sutherland (1996) derived explicit results for the sampling vari-
ance of variables, such as total government expenditure for example, which are obtained
by summing values over individuals in the sample. They estimated a three-state multino-
mial logit model for females, but did not consider hours variations (so that only earnings
enter utility functions). Understandably, given the computation burden at the time, they
rejected any kind of simulation approach.
4For details of the MITTS model, see Creedy et al. (2002).
32 Discrete Hours Labour Supply
This section describes the ingredients of the behavioural component of a tax
microsimulation model when using an approach to labour supply modelling
in which individuals are constrained to choose from a number of discrete
hours levels. It is assumed here that the required parameters of the direct
utility functions involved have been estimated and are now available for sim-
ulation.5 First, Subsection 2.1 describes the speciﬁcation of utility functions.
Am i c r o s i m u l a t i o nm o d e lm u s tb ea b l et oc a p t u r eag r e a td e a lo ft h eh e t -
erogeneity in preferences usually found in a population of households. This
subsection shows how personal characteristics are included in the direct util-
ity functions. Utility maximisation is outlined in Subsection 2.2, where it is
shown how a probability distribution over the available hours levels is gen-
erated for each individual, instead of a deterministic level of hours when a
discrete hours labour supply model is used. A tax policy reform has the ef-
fect of changing individuals’ net incomes corresponding to each discrete hours
point.6 Subsection 2.3 describes the numerical procedure used to generate
the distribution of hours worked following a tax policy reform, conditional
on each individual being at the observed position before the reform.
2.1 Personal Characteristics’ Eﬀects on Utility
The MITTS model uses quadratic direct utility functions deﬁned in terms of
hours worked, h, and net income, y to evaluate combinations of net income
and leisure/home production time. This can be expressed for individuals as:7
U (h,y)=βyy + βhh + αyy
2 + αhh
2 + αyhyh (1)
For couples, this quadratic expression can be extended as follows:






f + αymyhm + αyfyhf + αfmhfhm (2)
5For an introductory survey on the speciﬁcation, estimation and microsimulation with
discrete hours models, see Creedy and Kalb (2004).
6Some reforms modify eligibility conditions, and the enforcement of rules, in ways which
cannot be modelled using current methods, but which may aﬀect the take-up of beneﬁts.
7An early example of its use can be found in Keane and Moﬃtt (1998).
4where the subscript m denotes hours and parameters of the male, f denotes
corresponding values of the female, and y represents net household income.
The parameter αfm indicates whether the male and female labour supplies
are complements or substitutes.
This approach can be extended to make the preference parameters de-
pendent on personal and household characteristics, such as age of children or
an individual’s own age, which are likely to inﬂuence the preference for work
and income. For convenience, consider the simple linear utility function:
U = βhh + βyy (3)
After including characteristics in the preference for work parameter, the util-
ity function becomes:
U = {βh1 + βh2age + βh3d}h + βyy (4)
where, say, d =1if the age of the youngest child is 0 to 4, and d =0oth-
erwise. This approach can help to explain diﬀerences in behaviour between
individuals with similar wages but diﬀerent personal characteristics. The
utility functions discussed here represent ‘deterministic utility’ levels but, as
discussed in the next subsection, the model allows for an additional additive
stochastic term. This term could for example account for optimisation errors
by the household.
The MITTS model allows for a wide range of characteristics aﬀecting
the utility function, including age, education level, number of children and
age of the youngest child in the household. In addition, for sole parents
gender is included because this is the only group for which labour supply is
not estimated separately for men and women. For details of the estimation
method, see Creedy and Kalb (2004). The estimates used in the current
version of MITTS are reported in Kalb (2002), where estimation is carried
out for separate demographic groups; these are single males and females, sole
parents, and couples.
52.2 Utility Maximisation
Consider an individual with measured characteristics, X, who maximises
utility by selecting the number of hours worked, h, where only a discrete
number of hours levels, hi, (i =1 ,...,n) are available. As explained in Section
2.1, utility is determined by leisure and net income, but here it may be
written with hours of work as the sole argument, because conditional on wage
rates, other income and other characteristics, the hours of work determine
net income so there is a one-to-one relationship between hi and the level of
y for each household.
Utility associated with each hours level is denoted U∗
i and is a function
of deterministic utility U (hi|X) plus a random error term, vi, so that:
U
∗
i = U (hi|X)+vi
= Ui + vi (5)
The term vi arises from factors such as measurement errors concerning the
variables in X, optimisation errors of the individual or the existence of unob-
served preference characteristics. There is therefore a probability distribution
over the available discrete hours levels, which depends on the distribution of
vi.T h e vs are assumed to be independent and any observation on h is as-
sociated with a set of possible draws of the random variables v1 to vn from
their respective distributions.





j for all j (6)
Substituting for U∗
i , using (5), and rearranging, this condition is equivalent
to:
vj ≤ vi + Ui − Uj for all j (7)
If f (.) and F (.) are the density and distribution functions respectively
for all vi and all vi are independent of each other, the probability of hours







F (vi + Ui − Uj)
)
f (vi)dvi (8)





j6=i F (vi + Ui − Uj), and integrates vi out to obtain the
required probability pi.
Suppose the distribution of v is described by the Extreme (maximum)














One approach to simulation would be to use (11) to generate probability
distributions of hours worked for each person before and after a tax reform.
Predicted labour supply changes could then be based on the diﬀerence be-
tween expected (average) hours. The MITTS model does not use this explicit
form for the distribution of hours of work. Instead, a numerical method of
repeatedly drawing from the error distribution is adopted, which generates a
distribution of post-reform hours worked, conditional on the individual be-
ing at the observed pre-reform hours reported in the dataset.9 This so-called
calibration process is described in the following subsection.
2.3 Individual Calibration
Given estimated parameters of speciﬁed preference functions, and a set of
net incomes for each individual (or couple) arising from every possible dis-
crete hours level, the eﬀects on labour supply of tax policy changes can be
8See Madalla (1983) and Creedy and Kalb (2004) for details of the derivation of this
result.
9The former method would be much less intensive from a computational point of view,
as draws from error distributions would not be needed. However, following this approach
the post-reform results would not be conditional on the observed pre-reform hours, which
could be a disadvantage when aiming for realistic policy simulations.
7examined. The simulation method applied by MITTS is to use the labour
supply observed in the data set to obtain a starting point for each individual.
This ensures that the optimal labour supply of each individual corresponds
precisely to the observed labour supply under the particular tax and beneﬁt
system at the time of the survey. This process, referred to as ‘calibration’,
is described in the present subsection: a more formal description is given in
Appendix A.
The ﬁrst step is to discretise the observed hours, so that the individual’s
hours are set equal to the nearest discrete level available. Suppose there
are n hours levels. In the calibration process, a set of n independent error
terms is drawn from the relevant distribution (in this case, the extreme value
distribution) and these are added to the deterministic utility levels at each of
the hours points. If this results in the utility at the observed labour supply
being the optimal choice for the individual, the set of random values is stored.
It is useful to distinguish between ‘draws’ and ‘tries’: the former describes
a set of values which are stored for further use, while the latter describes
any set of random values from the extreme value distribution. If a ‘try’ does
not result in optimal hours that correspond to observed hours, another set of
error terms is obtained and another check is made. If, after say K attempts,
no set of random values has been found that places the individual at actual
pre-reform hours, instead of storing a ‘draw’, the individual’s hours of work
are assumed to be constant for this particular ‘draw’ when examining a policy
reform.
This process is repeated a speciﬁed number of times, say k,e a c ht i m eu s -
ing K tries if necessary. For most individuals, the draws are usually obtained
with few tries. However, for some individuals, a proportion of attempts to
produce a draw may not succeed after K tries. In a small number of cases,
no successful draws may be obtained even after a total of K times k sets of
n r a n d o mv a l u e sh a v eb e e nt a k e nf r o mt h ee r r o rd i s t r i b u t i o n .
The sets of error terms that result in the observed labour supply, the
k d r a w s ,a r et h e nu s e dt oc o m p u t ead i s t r i b u t i o no fh o u r sw o r k e df o re a c h
individual after a speciﬁed reform. Given the individual’s characteristics and
draws from the error term, utility at each hours level after the change can
8be determined using the new net incomes implied by the tax reform. The
hours level at which utility is maximised after the reform is determined for
each draw. In this way, a frequency distribution, based on k values, of post-
reform hours worked can be obtained and the probability of being at each
of the discrete hours points, conditional on the pre-reform labour supply, is
evaluated for each individual.10 As explained, some of the k draws, for a
selection of individuals, simply ﬁx labour supply at the pre-reform reported
level.
3 Construction of Conﬁdence Intervals
This section describes the simulation approach to generate a pseudo sam-
pling distribution of aggregate measures, allowing for the estimated joint
sampling distribution of the parameter estimates for the quadratic prefer-
ence functions. These parameters are augmented, as explained in Section
2.1, to allow for a range of individuals’ characteristics, and are estimated
separately for diﬀerent demographic groups. Essentially, the distributions
for the aggregate measures are assembled by repeatedly drawing from the es-
timated sampling distribution of parameters. For each set of parameters, the
calibration process and policy reform exercise as described in the previous
section are carried out.
In view of the discrete choice nature of the hours decision, revenue and
expenditure items for each individual are based on expected values, using
the computed probability distribution over hours for the post-reform tax
structure. For the pre-reform structure the revenue and costs are based on
the discretised value of observed hours worked. Population aggregates are
then obtained using the household weights provided with the SIHC by the
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
The empirical conﬁdence intervals are created using the point estimates
10This calibration method diﬀers slightly from earlier versions of MITTS, in which a
search for k draws was made using a speciﬁed total number of tries. If k draws were
not obtained (even if the number was close to k), the individual’s hours were ﬁxed. The
present method, however, makes use of any succesful draws, even if not all k draws could
be attained.
9of the parameters in the labour supply models (that is, the estimated para-
meters of the direct utility functions) and the estimated variance/covariance
matrix.11 Suppose it is required to calculate the conﬁdence intervals for
the changes in expenditure and revenue resulting from a particular policy
reform. These can be constructed through the use of the following simula-
tion method. First, a vector of labour supply parameters is drawn randomly
from a multivariate normal distribution with the mean and covariance ma-
trix given by the point estimates of the labour supply parameters and the
variance/covariance matrix for the parameters respectively.12 This vector of
labour supply parameters is used to carry out the calibration exercise de-
scribed in the previous section; that is, the required number of sets of draws
from the error distributions (the extreme value distributions) are generated
such that optimal labour supply corresponds to actual discretised hours in
the pre-reform situation. The process of these two steps taken together is de-
scribed as a ‘replication’. Thus, each vector of preference parameters, drawn
from the distribution of preference parameters, gives rise to a ‘replication’ of
the preference function, to distinguish it from the set of ‘draws’ from the error
distribution for each discrete hours level, which gives optimal hours as ob-
served hours in the pre-reform situation, and the ‘tries’ allowed in collecting
the set of draws.13
Combining the randomly drawn vector of preference parameters with all
the sets of draws from the error distributions obtained in the calibration
stage, it is possible to predict the proportion at each of the discrete hours
points after the reform. Given these proportions, the expected changes in
expenditure and revenue after the reform can be computed for each indi-
vidual and for the sample as a whole. This procedure is repeated a large
number of times. After each replication, the corresponding estimate for the
expected change in, say, expenditure is stored in a vector. After completing
11As mentioned earlier, the utility functions in MITTS are quadratic, with parameters
that are functions of individual characteristics, as in equation (4).
12The method used to obtain random values from a multivariate normal distribution is
described in Appendix B.
13The ‘tries’ resulting in successful ‘draws’ in the calibration exercise for one particular
‘replication’ may not place the individual at observed hours when a diﬀerent replication
is used. For this reason the calibration stage needs to be repeated for each replication.
10all replications, this vector, the pseudo sampling distribution, is ranked in
ascending order. A 90 percent conﬁdence interval can be constructed using
this vector by taking the 5th percentile and the 95th percentile as the lower
and upper bounds of the interval. In a similar fashion, conﬁdence intervals
can be constructed for other measures of interest, such as the probability of
participation or changes in revenue.
These calculations are computationally intensive. Indeed, it could take
weeks or even months - depending on the number of households, the number
of speciﬁed draws from the error distribution, the number of tries allowed for
each draw and the number of replications on which the intervals are based
-b e f o r ec o n ﬁdence intervals for the results from the behavioural component
could be provided for a particular policy change. For example, on a Pentium-
4 machine with 512 Mb of RAM and 1.90 GHz, it takes 200 minutes to run one
behavioural simulation for 7170 households in the 1997/98 SIHC dataset if,
for each household, the total number of draws is set to 100 and the maximum
number of tries allowed to calibrate the observed hours for each draw is set to
1000. If the simulation is repeated 1000 times it would take approximately
200,000 minutes (around 4.5 months) in total to calculate the conﬁdence
intervals for this sample.14 It is clear that this is impractical.
An obvious inﬂuence on the computation time is the number of individuals
or households examined. In order to keep the time to a minimum, it is
therefore best (where possible) to calculate the conﬁdence intervals for each
demographic group (for which separate preference parameter estimates are
obtained) separately rather than using all households in the dataset. This
allows the user to use more than one computer to calculate the intervals,
which will reduce the total amount of (calendar) time needed for calculations
for the entire population.
14The time required for each replication may not be the same, as diﬀerent numbers of
tries may be needed to obtain the requisite draws.
114 Numerical Examples: a Policy Change
This section uses the approach described in Section 3 to produce conﬁdence
intervals for the policy reform of reducing all taper rates in the March 1998
tax system, from 50 and 70 per cent to 30 per cent.15 This simulation uses
the 1997/98 SIHC dataset. Results are reported here for couples with chil-
dren and sole parents. Appendix C contains the results for the other groups
for comparison, but these are not discussed separately in this section. As
mentioned in Section 3, the number of draws as well as the maximum num-
ber of tries can be varied. Instead of taking an arbitrary number, it is useful
to experiment to ﬁnd the best combination; that is, the smallest set of draws
and tries which produces stable results. This is discussed in Subsection 4.1.
Conﬁdence intervals are then reported in Subsection 4.2 for changes in labour
supply, and in Subsection 4.3 for changes in government revenue and expen-
diture.
4.1 Sampling From the Error Distributions
Computation of conﬁdence intervals is complicated by the large number of
random variables generated in the calibration process, and the associated
utility maximisation analysis, which has to be repeated for each set of pref-
erence parameters. This subsection considers how this part of the process
can be reduced to a minimum.
Tables 1 and 2, for couples and singles respectively, provide an idea of
how sensitive the results of one replication are to diﬀerent combinations of
draws and tries. The ﬁrst two columns of these tables give the speciﬁed
combination of k, the number of draws, and K, t h en u m b e ro ft r i e sf o re a c h
draw. The third column gives the time in minutes to do a single simulation
for all households, using the point estimates of preference functions (using
a Pentium-4 machine with 512 Mb of Ram and 1.90 GHz). In each case
the variable r indicates the number of draws for which labour supply is held
15This is the reform considered in Creedy, Kalb and Kew (2003) using point estimates
of preference functions. However, the wage and preference functions used in MITTS have
since been re-estimated.
12constant at the base discretised hours (that is, after K tries, it was not
possible to ﬁnd a set of random variables from the error distribution giving
optimal hours equal to observed hours). For all groups, 11 hours points are
used in the labour supply model, except for married men, who are less likely
to work part time than the other groups. Therefore, only 6 hours points are
distinguished to model labour supply for this group.
Table 1: Average Hours Change by Number of Draws and Tries: All Couples
Time Average Hours Change
kK (mins) Married Married r<k r= k
Men Women
100 1000 200 0.46 -0.47 164 37
150 1000 280 0.46 -0.47 206 27
100 500 151 0.32 -0.50 256 64
100 100 80 0.13 -0.45 1002 99
50 1000 115 0.46 -0.48 93 64
40 1000 94 0.46 -0.50 78 73
30 1000 80 0.45 -0.48 57 81
20 1000 60 0.42 -0.48 42 88
10 1000 40 0.38 -0.49 21 99
10 700 38 0.35 -0.49 21 125
10 500 35 0.26 -0.51 37 155
10 100 30 0.01 -0.45 286 289
Note: The total number of couples with and without children is 2474.
k = number of draws; K = number of tries per draw;
r = no of draws which involve ﬁxed labour supply at base discretised hours.
When r < k, at least one, but less than k, draws are ﬁxed at base discretised hours.
When r = k, all k draws are ﬁxed at the base discretised hours.
The ﬁrst row of each table, where the number of draws and tries are
both relatively large, may be used as a benchmark. The results concern-
ing the average change in hours worked remain almost identical when the
number of draws is increased from 100 to 150, suggesting that the results be-
come stable as the number of draws and/or tries is increased above a certain
number. Choosing a smaller number of draws means that substantially less
13Table 2: Average Hours Change by Draws and Tries: Singles
Time Single Men Single Women Sole Parents
kK (mins) ∆Hr < kr = k ∆Hr < k r = k ∆Hr < kr = k
100 1000 200 0.33 53 6 0.14 32 2 2.28 7 0
150 1000 280 0.33 63 6 0.13 43 1 2.26 9 0
100 500 151 0.28 134 7 0.08 80 5 2.27 27 0
100 100 80 0.13 214 18 -0.06 231 12 2.20 132 0
50 1000 115 0.30 32 7 0.13 22 5 2.40 3 0
40 1000 94 0.29 28 9 0.12 19 6 2.49 2 0
30 1000 80 0.28 24 11 0.13 18 6 2.55 1 0
20 1000 60 0.27 14 16 0.13 11 11 2.64 0 0
10 1000 40 0.29 10 18 0.13 6 12 2.71 0 0
1 0 7 0 0 3 8 0 . 2 61 73 3 0 . 0 61 02 3 2 . 7 1 1 0
10 500 35 0.24 23 52 0.01 9 31 2.71 2 2
10 100 30 0.10 63 104 -0.10 58 64 2.47 24 16
Note: The total number of single men, single women and sole parents is 1392, 1038 and 503 respectively.
k = number of draws; K = number of tries per draw; ∆H = average hours change;
r = no of draws which involve ﬁxed labour supply at base discretised hours.
When r < k, at least one, but less than k, draws are ﬁxed at base discretised hours.
When r = k, all k draws are ﬁxed at the base discretised hours.
14time is needed to run one simulation. However, as the number of draws is
decreased, the results become less accurate and more variable across simula-
tions (depending more on the particular random draws that are taken from
the error distribution). Decreasing the number of tries means labour supply
is ﬁx e da to b s e r v e dh o u r sf o rm o r ed r a w s . T h a ti s ,t h ea v e r a g en u m b e ro f
hours for the diﬀerent subgroups are further from the benchmark results.
The last row, which has only 10 draws and 100 tries, presents changes in the
average numbers of hours worked that are very diﬀerent from the benchmark
ﬁgures.
The optimal number of draws and tries may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent
subgroups and diﬀerent policy simulations. Choosing 100 draws and 1000
tries is a safe choice for all groups, but it can most likely be reduced. It
appears that married men, single men, and single women are less sensitive to
the number of draws, but more sensitive to the number of tries. Sole parents,
on the other hand, are less sensitive to the number of tries, but the number
o fd r a w sp l a y sa ni m p o r t a n tr o l ei na c h i e v i n gas t a b l er e s u l t .T h er e s u l t sf o r
married women are the least sensitive of all groups. Before starting repeated
calculations to generate conﬁd e n c ei n t e r v a l s ,i ti su s e f u lt oe x p e r i m e n tw i t h
the number of draws and tries in a simulation, using the point estimates of
the labour supply model, to ﬁnd a combination that takes as little time to run
as possible while providing stable results. Investing some time at this stage
can reduce the time needed to compute the conﬁdence intervals considerably.
It was recommended in Section 3 that the conﬁdence intervals should be
calculated for one demographic group at a time rather than for all households
together, so that more than one computer could be used for the calculations.
A further advantage of separating the groups is that one demographic group
may require more draws to obtain a stable result than another demographic
group. By calculating the intervals separately for each subgroup the mini-
mum number of draws suﬃcient for that subgroup can be chosen.
These results show that it is impractical to set a large number of draws
and tries when calculating conﬁdence intervals, because the simulation needs
to be repeated so many times that the time needed with many draws becomes
problematic from a computational point of view. A large number of draws
15and tries may be unnecessary in many cases because the predicted values
become stable for much lower numbers of draws and tries. In obtaining the
results in the next subsections, in each case the decision was made to set the
n u m b e ro fd r a w st o4 0w i t h1 0 0 0t r i e sp e rd r a w .T h en u m b e ro fr e p l i c a t i o n s
was set to 1000.
4.2 Labour Supply
Table 3 presents the simulation results regarding labour supply changes.
All values refer to percentages of the demographic group, with the excep-
tion of the last row of each segment which reports the change in average
hours worked. Within each section of the table, the ﬁrst item, ‘all workers’
refers to the percentage of the demographic group working, including the self-
employed along with wage and salary earners. The second item ‘wage/sal.
workers’ refers to wage and salary earners, who are working and for whom
hours of work are observed, as a percentage of the total number of people
in the group. In the simulation, the behaviour of the self-employed is not
modelled, so their gross income is assumed to remain constant. The ﬁnal
three columns of Table 3 show the 5th and 95th percentiles of the pseudo
sampling distribution, along with the median value.
The eﬀect of the ﬂattening of the budget constraints has an ambiguous
eﬀect on labour supply, since marginal tax rates are reduced at lower working
hours while they are increased at higher levels of labour supply. The average
hours for women is expected to fall as a result of the reform. Although the
percentage of women who work fewer hours after the reform is actually lower
than the corresponding value for men, more married women move from work
to non-work. For men and women in couples, the conﬁdence intervals are
not particularly wide and it seems that these labour supply responses are
obtained with a reasonable amount of precision.
The reform is expected to have a larger eﬀect on the labour supply of sole
parents. A much larger proportion moves from non-work to work than for
couples, though this result is less precise as indicated by the wider conﬁdence
interval. The increase in average hours is signiﬁcantly larger than for people
16Table 3: Simulated Labour Supply Responses to Reduction in Taper Rates
Conﬁdence Intervals
mean 5% median 95%
Couples with children: Men
All workers: base 87.3
wage/sal. workers: base 72.57
wage/sal. workers: post 75.67 75.51 75.67 75.81
non-work to work 3.53 3.40 3.53 3.65
work to non-work 0.43 0.36 0.43 0.52
workers working more 0.67 0.57 0.67 0.75
workers working less 2.59 2.42 2.58 2.77
average hours change 0.99 0.91 0.99 1.06
Couples with children: Women
all workers: base 59.94
wage/sal. workers: base 51.12
wage/sal. workers: post 50.74 50.52 50.74 50.97
non-work to work 2.28 2.07 2.28 2.49
work to non-work 2.67 2.5 2.67 2.83
workers working more 0.2 0.16 0.2 0.23
workers working less 1.02 0.89 1.02 1.15
average hours change -0.63 -0.7 -0.63 -0.55
Sole Parents
all workers: base 47.37
wage/sal. workers: base 42.71
wage/sal. workers: post 50.94 49.29 50.7 53.46
non-work to work 8.45 6.81 8.2 10.96
work to non-work 0.22 0.10 0.22 0.36
workers working more 1.89 1.28 1.87 2.54
workers working less 2.34 1.94 2.32 2.82
average hours change 2.63 1.98 2.56 3.49
17in couples, though again the conﬁdence interval is wider. Comparing the
standard deviations for the point estimates of the labour supply parameters
for sole parents and couples, not reported here, it is clear that those for
couples are relatively smaller, indicating more precise estimates.16 Obviously,
this has translated into more precise predictions for behavioural changes in
the simulation for couples.
4.3 Revenue and Expenditure
Table 4 reports results for the demographic groups regarding a number of
revenue and expenditure aggregates. This table reports the aggregates in
millions of dollars for the base tax and transfer system under the pre-reform
heading. These are evaluated at the discretised hours, the discrete hours level
nearest to the actual hours reported. The eﬀects of the reform, under the
extreme assumption that labour supplies do not change, is given under the
heading ‘ﬁxed labour’, which shows the absolute change in the expenditure or
r e v e n u eo ne a c hi t e m .T h eﬁnal columns show details of the absolute change,
while allowing for labour supply changes, except for the self-employed, the
retired and disabled, whose labour supplies are ﬁxed at their observed pre-
reform hours.17
The comparisons show ﬁrst that allowing for potential labour supply ef-
fects of tax reforms matters in the estimation of taxes and expenditures. Not
allowing for such responses would, for example, lead to a signiﬁcant over-
statement of the income tax revenue change for couples. The assumption of
ﬁxed labour supply suggests that tax rebates for sole parents are expected to
fall, yet the positive net labour supply responses imply that rebates increase.
Furthermore, the increase in allowances for sole parents is substantially lower
when labour supply is endogenous. The increase in net expenditure on this
demographic group is signiﬁcantly overstated when labour supply is held
ﬁxed.
16For details, see Kalb (2002).
17In addition, there is the small number of individuals who cannot be placed at their
observed hours level in the base system, even after Kk sets of n random values are exam-
ined.
18Table 4: Change in Tax and Transfer Costs Resulting from Reduced Taper
Rates
Changes from Pre- to Post-Reform
Pre- Fixed Variable Labour Supply
Reform Labour Mean Conﬁdence Intervals
($m) ($m) ($m) 5% median 95%
Couples
Revenue
Income Tax 28929.8 527.1 392.6 349.4 393.0 431.6
Medicare 1736.5 74.6 70.2 67.1 70.2 73.0
Total Revenue 30666.3 601.7 462.8 417.1 463.0 504.0
Expenditure
Tax Rebates 1181 -363.4 -350.3 -353.5 -350.3 -346.9
Fam Payment 4078.3 1686.9 2035.6 2017.7 2035.3 2055.4
FTP/FTB 402.4 179.2 214.7 211.6 214.6 217.7
Allowances 4271.7 3620.8 3468.0 3426.9 3467.1 3509.2
Pensions 737.7 42.5 27.0 23.5 27.0 33.5
Pharm Allow 8.9 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2
Rent Allow 359.8 119.9 156.7 153.3 156.7 160.0
Total Expenditure 11039.9 5286.6 5551.6 5493.8 5551.9 5611.9
Net Expenditure -19626.4 4684.8 5088.8 4992.6 5088.2 5191.5
Sole parents
Income Tax 1900.4 75.6 158.7 123.9 156.4 199.7
Medicare 83.9 4.8 5.6 4.0 5.6 7.1
Total Revenue 1984.4 80.4 164.3 128.1 161.8 206.9
Expenditure
Tax Rebates 553.6 -12.5 18.7 12.6 17.9 28.0
Fam Payment 2139.7 90.2 132.5 124.6 132.2 141.1
F T P / F T B 2 2 9 . 9 000 00
Allowances 3025.2 264.2 93.7 35.6 97.8 136.6
Pensions 155 1.1 -4.1 -5.6 -4.0 -2.6
Pharm Allow 49.8 6.0 7.5 7.2 7.4 7.8
Rent Allow 405.7 5.8 14.8 12.6 14.8 17.2
Total Expenditure 6558.9 354.7 263.1 220.2 265.4 299.3
Net Expenditure 4574.5 274.3 98.8 11.3 102.4 171.0
19In addition, Table 4 shows that for couples, the conﬁdence intervals for
most items are relatively small. However, some of the sole parent conﬁdence
intervals are relatively large. For example, changes in tax rebates, allowances
and especially net expenditure are estimated with a relatively low precision.
The width of the conﬁdence interval for the change in net expenditure is
about 200 million dollars for couples with children and about 160 million
dollars for sole parents. Given the much lower number of sole parents in the
population, this means that per individual the uncertainty associated with
t h ee x p e c t e dc h a n g ea f t e rt h er e f o r mi ss u b s t a n t i a l l yl a r g e rf o rs o l ep a r e n t s .
5A n A l t e r n a t i v e A p p r o a c h
The previous section has demonstrated the value of examining conﬁdence
intervals using the proposed method of computing a pseudo sampling dis-
tribution. It showed that all predicted changes were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. This indicates that there is some conﬁdence in the direction of
the predicted eﬀects. The main drawback of the method is the length of
time needed, given the large computational burden. Even with fast modern
c o m p u t e r s ,t h et i m ei n v o l v e di st o ol a r g et om a k ei tv i a b l ef o rr e g u l a ru s e ,
particularly when attempting to design policy reforms. The design of policy
changes, with a range of objectives in mind, including a government budget
constraint, typically involves the examination of a large number of experi-
ments. Hence the question arises of whether a faster method of constructing
conﬁdence intervals can be found. This question is addressed in the present
section.
The role of the sets of random draws from the error distributions relating
to the direct utility function, with a maximum number of tries, has been dis-
cussed. Before obtaining conﬁdence intervals, experiments were carried out
to ﬁnd the minimum combination of k and K (draws and tries respectively)
that appeared to be viable. Hence there is little room to further reduce this
aspect of the computational burden.
Examination of Tables 3 and 4 shows that the mean and median changes
resulting from the tax change are in all cases close to each other, suggesting
20that the relevant distributions are close to being symmetric.18 The potential
for reducing the number of replications was explored by plotting histograms
of the various empirical pseudo sampling distributions, having obtained a
range of distributions, such as distributions for various expenditure and rev-
enue items, as well as total expenditure and revenue, based on 1000 replica-
tions. Examples for sole parents are shown in Figure 1. The left hand set
of distributions relate to labour supply changes and the right hand set is for
total revenue and expenditure, and net expenditure. In each histogram, the
continuous line shows the density function of a normal distribution having
the same arithmetic mean and variance as the empirical frequencies.
While the distributions do not appear to be well-described by the normal
distribution, and in fact normality is rejected for some of the distributions, it
is useful to consider an approach that is based on the properties of the normal
distribution given the reasonably symmetric shape of many of the distribu-
tions. Thus, instead of taking a large number of replications and ﬁnding the
5th and 95th percentiles, consider using a smaller number of replications to
estimate the mean µ and standard deviation σ for the outcomes of inter-
est. Assuming normality, the appropriate percentiles of the standard normal
N (0,1) distribution can then be used to ﬁnd the required conﬁdence interval
based on N (µ,σ2). For example, the 5th and 95th percentiles are obtained
as µ ± 1.645σ.
Results of this exercise are given in Figure 2, which shows, for each sum-
mary variable, the 90 per cent conﬁdence limits obtained when using 1000
replications (represented by the solid horizontal lines in the graphs) and the
limits produced when an assumption of normality is used, as the number
of replications (N) is increased. It can be seen that the conﬁdence limits
produced by assuming normality are reasonably close to those obtained from
1000 replications, even for as few as 50 replications. However, the limits using
1000 replications take about 20 times longer to produce than those obtained
using only 50 replications. This means that most results could be produced
within one or two days with this more approximate approach.
18Furthermore, inspection of the (unreported) results using only the point estimates of
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Figure 2: Number of Replications (N) and Conﬁdence Intervals: Sole Parents
23Figures 3 and 4 show the histograms for the labour supply summary
changes for married men and married women respectively. For this group,
the pseudo sampling distributions are closer to normality (as also shown by
a range of distributions for other variables, not presented here). The right
hand segments of these ﬁgures compare the conﬁdence limits obtained from
1000 replications compared with the use of small samples and an assumption
of normality. Again, good approximations are produced with as few as 50
replications. Similar results apply to tax and expenditure totals for couples
a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e5 .
Similar results were found to apply to a wide range of expenditure and
revenue categories. The same is true for other demographic groups, and brief
results for single men and women, and couples without children are reported
in Appendix C. Even where the plotted histograms are not particularly close
to being normal, the use of a smaller number of replications combined with
an assumption of normality provides a good guide to the conﬁdence intervals
that are produced by the use of a large number of replications to generate a
pseudo sampling distribution. Exceptions to this general rule were found to
arise in the case of the pharmaceutical allowance for couples and sole parents.
Where very few individuals in the sample are in receipt of a particular beneﬁt,
as in this case, caution must be exercised. However, the aggregate amount
of this payment compared to those of other payments is negligible, so the
uncertainty associated with it tends to have only a small eﬀect on the total
expenditure and revenue.
6 Conclusions
This paper has examined one important source of uncertainty surrounding
tax policy simulations of labour supply, taxation and revenue changes, when
using a behavioural tax microsimulation model. This arises from the fact
that the preference functions, on which predicted labour supply behaviour
is based, are estimated using econometric methods, and typically only the
point estimates are used in simulations. While the uncertainty associated
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Figure 3: Married Men: Histograms of Simulation Outcomes and Conﬁdence
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Figure 4: Married Women: Histograms of Simulation Outcomes and Conﬁ-































































Figure 5: Couples’ Revenue and Expenditure: Histograms of Simulation
Outcomes and Conﬁdence Intervals by Number of Replications (N)
27simulations of policy reforms, it represents the major additional source gen-
erated by the extra requirements of behavioural microsimulation compared
with arithmetic, or non-behavioural, models.
The analysis was carried out in the context of the MITTS model for the
Australian direct tax and transfer system. MITTS uses a discrete hours
structural approach to labour supply modelling, whereby a probability dis-
tribution over a set of discrete hours levels is generated after a policy reform,
conditional on each individual being placed at the observed hours in the base
dataset. For each variable of interest, a pseudo sampling distribution was gen-
erated by taking repeated random draws from the multivariate distribution of
parameter values in the preference functions, obtained from maximum likeli-
hood estimation. A broad ﬁnding is that, for most demographic groups and
variables, the 90 per cent conﬁd e n c ei n t e r v a l sa r er e l a t i v e l yn a r r o w . H e n c e
the additional uncertainty introduced by behavioural modelling seems low.
Exceptions were found for several variables in the case of sole parents. The
large conﬁdence intervals in those cases were associated with the higher es-
timated variances in the variance/covariance matrix for this demographic
group.
A disadvantage of this approach, which requires a large number of repli-
cations, is that the computational requirements are great. Simulation results
for a single demographic group can take several weeks or months to com-
plete. Further investigation revealed that results close to the intervals based
on 1000 replications can generally be obtained by taking a smaller number
of replications, sometimes as low as 40 to 50, and using these to estimate
the mean and variance of the outcome of interest. Under the assumption of
the outcome being normally distributed, a conﬁdence interval can then be
constructed. This method appears to overcome the computational burden
without sacriﬁcing much accuracy.
28Appendix A: Labour Supply Calibration and
Simulation
This appendix provides a more formal description of the calibration and
simulation processes used in MITTS. Assume an individual is observed to
work at the discretised hours level, hi. In the calibration stage (for a given
set of preference function parameter values), suppose that it is required to
obtain k sets of draws from the error distributions (for each hours level) for
which the individual’s optimal hours are equal to the observed hours. A total
of up to K attempts, or ‘tries’ are allowed to generate each draw. There are
n discrete hours levels.












denote the jth vector of n random variables (the jth ‘try’) drawn from the











denote the n-vector of utilities corresponding to the hours levels, calculated
using the tax and transfer system to obtain the associated net incomes for
each discrete hours level under the base (or pre-reform) system. Finally, let









































For each ‘try’ a check is made to see if U
∗b(j)
i is the maximum value among
U
∗b(j)
  for all other   6= i. If so, this means that the individual chooses to work
at hi, which corresponds to the observed discrete hours for this individual.
In this case, the vector v(j) is stored for use in the simulation stage; this
corresponds to a ‘draw’. If U
∗b(j)
i is not the maximum value, v(j) is discarded
and another set of n random values from the error distribution (another ‘try’)
29is selected. This process is repeated until a successful ‘draw’ has been found.
If, after K tries, no set is found for which optimal and observed discretised
hours are equal, hours are held ﬁx e da tt h eo b s e r v e dh o u r sf o rt h i sd r a w .
This process is repeated k times. For most individuals, k draws are
obtained using far less than the K tries for each.




denote the n-vector of utilities after the tax reform. Then calculate U∗r(j),









































For each j =1 ,...,k a check is made to see which U
∗r(j)
  ,f o r  =1 ,...,n,i s
t h em a x i m u mv a l u ei nt h ev e c t o rU∗r(j). This determines the discrete hours
level after the reform for the jth set of draws, given that the individual was
at hi i nt h eb a s es y s t e m .T h ek draws thus generate the probabilities of being
at each of the discrete hours points after the reform by counting the number
of times for which a draw results in a particular hours point, and dividing
this number by the total number of draws k. As mentioned before, for some
individuals, a number of the k draws may be replaced by an assumption
that labour supply is unchanged as a result of the tax reform. In that case,
the discrete hours level after the reform is the same as the observed discrete
hours level before the reform.
30Appendix B: Random Draws From a Multi-
variate Normal Distribution
This appendix describes how random draws from a multivariate normal dis-
tribution may be obtained, given a vector of means and a variance/covariance
matrix. In the univariate case, if η is a random draw from an N (0,1) distri-
bution, a random observation, x, from a univariate normal, N (µ,σ2) is given
by:
x = µ + ση (15)
The corresponding result for an n-element vector x from a multivariate nor-
mal, MN(µ,Ω),i s :
x = µ + Ω
1
2η (16)
where µ and η are n-element vectors and Ω is an n by n variance-covariance
(symmetric positive deﬁnite) matrix:









To generate a random set of draws from the multivariate distribution
requires the matrix Ω1/2,which is the square root of Ω,a n dη, which consists
of n draws from the standard normal distribution N (0,1). This matrix can
be obtained using the Cholesky factorisation, which states that a symmetric
positive deﬁnite matrix Ω can be expressed as:
Ω = LL
0 (18)
where L is a lower triangular matrix. Given Ω1/2 = L,( 1 6 )c a nb er e w r i t t e n
as:
x = µ + Lη (19)
Conﬁrmation of this result can be obtained by examining the mean and
variance, as follows. The mean is:
E (x)=E (µ + Lη)














0 = Ω (21)
The Cholesky factorisation, that is, the solution for L in (18), can be
achieved using the following simple recursive algorithm:
Start with: L11 =
√
σ11
Then calculate for i =2 ,...,n: Li1 = σi1/L11
For all j =2 ,...,n:














For all i<j : Lij =0
(22)
where Lij denotes the element in the ith row and the jth column of L.
32Appendix C: Results for Singles and Couples
Without Children
Section 4 concentrated on simulation results for couples with children and
sole parents. This appendix reports comparable results for single men and
women, and couples without children. The tables show that in general the
conﬁdence intervals are quite narrow for these groups, and the use of a small
number of replications combined with an assumption of normality can provide
reliable estimates of those intervals.
Table 5: Simulated Labour Supply Responses to a Reduction in Taper Rates:
Single Men and Women
Conﬁdence Intervals
mean 5% median 95%
Single Men
all workers: base 67.30
wage/sal. workers: base 59.57
wage/sal. workers: post 61.31 60.89 61.30 61.78
non-work to work 1.86 1.45 1.85 2.33
work to non-work 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.16
workers working more 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.17
workers working less 1.24 1.04 1.21 1.57
average hours change 0.41 0.27 0.41 0.55
Single Women
all workers: base 48.01
wage/sal. workers: base 44.90
wage/sal. workers: post 46.92 46.59 46.91 47.28
non-work to work 2.16 1.83 2.14 2.52
work to non-work 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.17
workers working more 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.20
workers working less 2.79 2.39 2.77 3.22
average hours change 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.26
33Table 6: Change in Tax and Transfer Costs Resulting from a Reduction in
Taper Rates: Single Men and Women
Pre- Changes from Pre- to Post-Reform
Reform Fixed Variable Labour Supply
Labour Mean Conﬁdence Intervals
($m) ($m) ($m) 5% median 95%
Single Men
Revenue
Income Tax 12667.8 352.2 389.7 353.8 390.9 421.1
Medicare 863.1 35.0 43.6 40.2 43.6 47.1
Total Revenue 13530.9 387.1 433.3 394.2 434.4 468.1
Expenditure
Tax Rebates 436 -8.7 -24.9 -29.9 -24.9 -20.5
Allowances 3564.5 1266.8 1108.2 1053.5 1107.8 1158.7
Pensions 3336.7 142.7 134.3 130.5 134.2 137.7
Pharm Allow 58.2 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2
Rent Allow 356.3 333.2 344.0 342.0 343.7 346.9
Total Expenditure 7751.7 1737.1 1564.7 1506.1 1564.3 1619.7
Net Expenditure -5779.2 1349.9 1131.3 1036.3 1130.5 1224.3
Single Women
Revenue
Income Tax 7192.9 329.3 267.4 242.3 267.5 291.8
Medicare 473.9 32.0 36.0 34.0 36.1 38.1
Total Revenue 7666.7 361.3 303.4 276.8 303.8 329.8
Expenditure
Tax Rebates 707.8 -23.4 -36.0 -38.5 -36.0 -33.3
Allowances 2264.8 1051.4 1023.7 995.3 1022.5 1053.6
Pensions 7456.4 236.6 203.9 196.4 204.5 209.5
Pharm Allow 117.2 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
Rent Allow 289.3 261.0 278.2 275.3 278.2 281.0
Total Expenditure 10835.4 1530.2 1474.5 1442.1 1473.8 1508.5




































































Figure 6: Single Men: Histograms of Labour Supply Simulation Outcomes






























































Figure 7: Single Men: Histograms of Revenue and Expenditure Simulation



































































Figure 8: Single Women: Histograms of Labour Supply Simulation Outcomes



































































Figure 9: Single Women: Histograms of Revenue and Expenditure Simulation
Outcomes and Conﬁdence Intervals by Number of Replications (N)
38Table 7: Simulated Labour Supply Responses to a Reduction in Taper Rates
Conﬁdence Intervals
mean 5% median 95%
Married men without children
all workers: base 57.17
wage/sal. workers: base 45.24
wage/sal. workers: post 45.58 45.43 45.58 45.74
non-work to work 1.11 0.99 1.11 1.22
work to non-work 0.76 0.66 0.76 0.86
workers working more 0.22 0.15 0.21 0.28
workers working less 0.79 0.72 0.79 0.85
average hours change 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.10
Married women without children
all workers: base 46.63
wage/sal. workers: base 39.79
wage/sal. workers: post 39.22 39.05 39.22 39.41
non-work to work 0.57 0.46 0.56 0.68
work to non-work 1.13 0.98 1.13 1.27
workers working more 0.24 0.17 0.23 0.33
workers working less 0.73 0.66 0.73 0.79
average hours change -0.34 -0.40 -0.34 -0.27
Table 8: Change in Tax and Transfer Costs Resulting from Reduced Tapers
Changes from Pre- to Post-Reform
Couples without Pre- Fixed Variable Labour Supply
children Reform Labour Mean Conﬁdence Intervals
($m) ($m) ($m) 5% median 95%
Revenue
Income Tax 21001.1 527.3 337.6 308.0 338.2 367.7
Medicare 1327.4 58.0 48.4 46.3 48.4 50.6
Total Revenue 22328.5 585.3 386 354.2 386.7 418.2
Expenditure
Tax Rebates 1327.8 -194.0 -193.9 -196.3 -193.9 -191.7
Allowances 2612.2 2403.6 2495.5 2463.6 2496.4 2524.8
Pensions 10151.2 771.5 768.5 762.4 769.1 772.4
Pharm Allow 109.1 10.1 10.2 10.1 10.2 10.4
Rent Allow 170.8 127.0 141.7 139.7 141.8 143.4
Total Expenditure 14371.0 3118.3 3222.0 3187.7 3222.5 3254.7
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Figure 10: Couples without children: Histograms of Male Labour Supply
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Figure 11: Couples without children: Histograms of Female Labour Supply































































Figure 12: Couples Without Children: Histograms of Revenue and Expendi-
ture Simulation Outcomes and Conﬁdence Intervals by Number of Replica-
tions (N)
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